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In the summer of 2017, hundreds of thousands of videos of the
Syrian conflict suddenly disappeared from YouTube. 2 The videos had
been published on channels like the Aleppo Media Center, the Shaam
News Agency, and the Violations Documentation Center in Syria,
which are run by Syrian civil society groups that have been
documenting war crimes and other human rights violations since the
conflict began in 2011. 3 In a war zone that has been extraordinarily
difficult for outside investigators to access, the videos provided crucial
evidence that many hoped would eventually lead to international
criminal prosecutions. 4

1.

Associate professor of Law, American University Washington College of
Law.

2.

Malachy Browne, YouTube Removes Videos Showing Atrocities in Syria,
22,
2017),
N.Y.
TIMES(Aug.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/world/middleeast/syria-youtubevideos-isis.html [perma.cc/YF4X-SFVA].

3.

Tech Advocacy: Amount of Content Preserved, Made Unavailable and
Restored, Syrian Archive, https://syrianarchive.org/en/tech-advocacy
[https://perma.cc/TFF9-FEMX]; Dia Kayyali, Vital Human Rights
Evidence in Syria is Disappearing from Youtube, Witness (Aug. 30, 2017),
https://blog.witness.org/2017/08/vital-human-rights-evidence-syriadisappearing-youtube/ [https://perma.cc/SK84-P879].

4.

See, e.g., Protocol of Cooperation Between the International, Independent
and Impartial Mechanism and Syrian Civil Society Organisations
Participating in the Laussane Platform, https://iiim.un.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/04/Protocol_IIIM_-_Syrian_NGOs_English.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9JM8-BJVW]. There is already precedent for the use
of social-media evidence in international criminal prosecutions. See
Prosecutor v. Al-Werfalli, ICC-01/11-01/17, Warrant of Arrest, ¶ 3 (Aug.
15, 2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2017_05031.PDF
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One can readily imagine that any of the perpetrators whose crimes
were caught on these videos would have had an interest in their
disappearance. But in this case at least, no one in Syria was responsible.
The disappearance of the videos was the work of YouTube’s software
engineers. 5 Employees of the Silicon Valley-based social media platform
had no intention of deleting potential war crimes evidence; they were
trying, in fact, to fight terrorism online. 6 They had introduced a new
algorithm to improve the rate at which YouTube could detect and
remove terrorist content 7 – but the algorithm had been unable to
consistently distinguish propaganda posted by ISIS from war crimes
documentation posted by human rights activists. 8
In response to media coverage, many of the videos were
subsequently restored. 9 But the incident was illustrative of a more
fundamental, and less appreciated, development: the influx of new
actors into the landscape of international criminal investigations.
YouTube employees, like many of the other new actors in this
space, do not enter this landscape with the same set of professional
norms or operate according to the same priorities as the courtappointed investigators who have traditionally dominated this work.
Indeed, for YouTube and other social media companies that have
become important repositories of war crimes evidence, international
criminal investigations are not something they ever intended, or
anticipated, being involved in. 10
[https://perma.cc/54D9-6VJN] (relying on video posted to social media
in the issuance of the arrest warrant).
5.

Bernhard Warner, Tech Companies Are Deleting Evidence of War
ATLANTIC
(May
8,
2019),
Crimes,
THE
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/05/facebookalgorithms-are-making-it-harder/588931/
[https://perma.cc/9RCDJZGD].

6.

Kent Walker, Four Steps We’re Taking Today to Tight Terrorism Online,
GOOGLE (June 18, 2017), https://www.blog.google/around-theglobe/google-europe/four-steps-were-taking-today-fight-onlineterror/[perma.cc/XN6G-SD34].

7.

Tim Mak, Critics Say YouTube Hasn’t Done Enough to Crack Down on
Extremist
Content,
NPR
(Nov.
27,
2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/11/27/671285261/critics-say-youtube-hasntdone-enough-to-crack-down-on-extremist-content
[perma.cc/2QBGPP6D].

8.

Armin Rosen, Erasing History: YouTube’s Deletion of Syria War Videos
Concerns Human Rights Groups, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 7, 2018),
https://www.fastcompany.com/40540411/erasing-history-youtubesdeletion-of-syria-war-videos-concerns-human-rights-groups
[perma.cc/HDG2-7YQ9].

9.

Id.

10.

YouTube is not the only social media platform where such evidence has
been uploaded. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Al-Werfalli, ICC-01/11-01/17,
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Investigating Atrocities
The first major criminal investigations of atrocity crimes in the
post-Nuremberg period began with the UN-created ad hoc tribunals of
the nineties. The tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda took
as a given that gathering evidence would require in-person contact
between their staff and the victims and witnesses of the crimes they
sought to prosecute. 11 The same was true with the International
Criminal Court (ICC), established in 2002 12 – although access
difficulties meant the ICC soon began to rely on a network of human
rights groups and UN-affiliated agencies to help them gather evidence
in places the Court’s staff could not reach. 13
As others have documented, the introduction of these so-called
“intermediaries” into the investigative process caused significant
challenges, culminating in the ICC’s first case almost being derailed on
the opening day of trial. 14 Such problems were a harbinger of the
challenges that now loom as technology promises to transform the
investigatory landscape beyond recognition.
In 2007, Apple’s launch of the iPhone – and the cheaper alternatives
that subsequently flooded the market - set the course for a major
disruption in the way that international criminal investigations
operate. 15 Soon, millions of people across the world – including in areas
Warrant of Arrest, ¶ 11 (Aug. 15 2017), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2017_05031.PDF
[https://perma.cc/54D96VJN] (indicating Facebook has been used to upload such videos).
11.

See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA & UNITED NATIONS INTERREGIONAL CRIME AND JUSTICE
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, ICTY MANUAL ON DEVELOPED PRACTICES 15–27
(2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/ICT
Y_Manual_on_Developed_Practices.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EN5SGYP7] (discussing the ICTY’s “information gathering” techniques).

12.

See Understanding the International Criminal Court, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL
COURT,
https://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf
[perma.cc/Z2VPA77K] (referring to the “field work” of the Court and its obligation to
ensure security to the “individuals who interact with them,” implying inperson contact).

13.

For a survey of this development, and the problems that arose from it,
see generally Elena Baylis, Outsourcing Investigations, 14 UCLA J. INT’L.
FOREIGN AFF. 121 (2009).

14.

See id. at 123; Caroline Buisman, Delegating Investigations: Lessons to
be Learned from the Lubanga Judgment, NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 30, 37
(2013).

15.

See Rebecca Hamilton, New Technologies in International Criminal
Investigations, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASIL ANNUAL MEETING, 112, 131–33
(2018).
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where atrocities were underway – had a video camera in their pockets
virtually 24/7. 16 This created the possibility of user-generated evidence
– digital documentation done in or near real-time by those at the scene
of the crime - being produced on a mass scale. 17 And with the advent
of social media, people began posting this documentation online.18
This conflagration of developments first came together during the
conflict that followed the uprising against Syrian President Bashar al
Assad in 2011. 19 As Google product manager, Justin Kosslyn, put it:
“The Syrian civil war is in many ways the first YouTube conflict in the
same way that Vietnam was the first television conflict.” 20 The usergenerated evidence that Syrians posted on social media became an
invaluable resource for the human rights groups that the Syrian
government refused to allow into the country. 21 Advocates of
international criminal justice began thinking how they could harness
the material that Syrians were, in many instances, risking their lives to
record.
In 2013, Western donors supported a major conference, convened
at UC Berkeley, to figure out how best to use the growing amount of
digital evidence being posted online in international criminal
investigations. 22 Around the same time, former ICC investigator,
William Wiley, founded an international criminal investigations nonprofit, the Commission for International Justice and Accountability,
which trained Syrians on how to document what they were seeing in

16.

See Elizabeth O’Shea and Kelly Matheson, 5 Reasons to Use Video as
Evidence for ICC Crimes, COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT
(Nov.
11,
2016),
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/news/20161111/5-reasons-use-videoevidence-icc-crimes [perma.cc/Y5PJ-998Z] (discussing the pervasive use
of smartphone video by witnesses to atrocities).

17.

See generally, Rebecca J. Hamilton, User-Generated Evidence, 57 COL. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (2018).

18.

Id. at 16.

19.

Marc Lynch, et al., SYRIA’S SOCIALLY MEDIATED CIVIL WAR 7 (United
States Inst. of Peace, Peaceworks No. 91, 2014).

20.

Rosen, supra note 8.

21.

See e.g. Syria: Coordinated Chemical Attacks on Aleppo Security Council
Should Impose Sanctions, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 13, 2017),
[perma.cc/5S7L-EL75] (discussing Human Rights Watch’s use of video
uploaded by the Aleppo Media Center to call attention to a February
2017 chemical weapons attack in Aleppo).

22.

HUM. RTS. CTR. U.C. BERKELEY SCH. OF L., DIGITAL FINGERPRINTS:
USING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE TO ADVANCE PROSECUTIONS AT THE
INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL
COURT
1
(2014),
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/HRC/Digital_fingerprints_interior
_cover2.pdf.
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ways that would be useful for future international criminal
prosecutions. 23
In 2016, the United Nations established an International, Impartial
and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) to gather documentation that
could potentially be used in future prosecutions of international crimes
committed in Syria. 24 The IIIM, like other external actors, has thus far
been barred from entering Syria by the Syrian government, so it has
focused on the collation of digital documentation, even signing a
Protocol of Cooperation with Syrian civil society groups that collect
digital evidence. 25
The growing reliance on digital evidence in international criminal
investigations now extends beyond Syria. In 2017, the UN established
a Fact-Finding Commission to investigate atrocities against the Muslim
minority Rohingya population in Myanmar. 26 Prohibited from entering
the country by the Myanmar government, its investigation also relied
heavily on digital documentation, in particular evidence posted on
Facebook. 27 Then in 2018, the UN established a new independent body
for Myanmar, designed to function like the IIIM for Syria, that would

23.

Melinda Rankin, The Future of International Criminal Evidence in New
Wars? The Evolution of the Commission for International Justice and
Accountability, 20 J. GENOCIDE RES. 392 (2018).

24.

G.A. Res. A/71/L/48, International, Impartial and Independent
Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Those
Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law
Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 (Dec. 21, 2016).
Int’l., Impartial Indep. Mechanism, Protocol of Cooperation between the
International, Independent and Impartial Mechanism and Syrian Civil
Society Organizations participating in the Lausanne Platform (Apr. 3,
2018),
https://iiim.un.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/04/Protocol_IIIM_-_Syrian_NGOs_English.pdf
[perma.cc/3K2R-4WSF].

25.

Int’l., Impartial Indep. Mechanism, Protocol of Cooperation between the
International, Independent and Impartial Mechanism and Syrian Civil
Society Organizations participating in the Lausanne Platform (Apr. 3,
2018),
https://iiim.un.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/04/Protocol_IIIM__Syrian_NGOs_English.pdf [perma.cc/3K2R-4WSF].

26.

Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, UNITED
NATIONS
HUMAN
RIGHTS
COUNCIL,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/myanmarffm/pages/index.aspx
[perma.cc/M25J-3FAE].

27.

See United Nations Human Rights Council, Myanmar UN Fact-Finding
Mission Releases its Full Account of Massive Violations by Military in
Rakhine,
Kachin
and
Shan
States
(Sept.
18,
2018),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?N
ewsID=23575&LangID=E [perma.cc/2EZ8-EKAK].
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“[b]e able to make use of the information collected by the fact-finding
mission and continue to collect evidence.” 28

Digital Documentation
There is justifiable excitement about what digital documentation
can offer international criminal investigations. 29 When those who are
on the scene during, or soon after, the commission of atrocity crimes
record what they see, the access problems facing outside investigators
are overcome and evidence that may otherwise be lost or destroyed is
instead preserved. 30 But as with any new technology, digital
documentation in general, and user-generated evidence in particular,
raises challenges.
To date, much of the scholarly conversation about the challenges
of working with digital evidence has focused on the evidence itself. One
key question is whether the evidence can be authenticated. 31 Unless
judges can be assured of the authenticity of digital evidence, its
potential value to international criminal investigations will not be
realized. And this is a concern that will only continue to grow with the
emergence of so-called “deep fakes” – falsified videos that are
sophisticated enough to deceive most viewers. 32 Another question has
involved how to train non-professionals to undertake documentation in
a way that will be useful for an international criminal investigator.33
And more recently, as scholars have begun to grasp the sheer volume
of digital documentation being posted online, new concerns have been
raised about how to sort through hours of footage and coordinate the
transfer of digital evidence to those who may be able to use it. 34
28.

Human Rights Council Res. 39/2, U.N. Dᴏᴄ. A/HRC/RES/39/2, ¶ 23
(Sept. 27, 2018).

29.

See, e.g., HUM. RTS. CTR. U.C. BERKELEY SCH. OF L., supra note 22.

30.

See Hamilton, supra note 17, at 3.

31.

Nikita Mehandru & Alexa Koeing, Open Source Evidence and the
International Criminal Court, HARV. HUM. RTS J. (April 15, 2019),
https://harvardhrj.com/2019/04/open-source-evidence-and-theinternational-criminal-court/#_ftn1 [perma.cc/7GV3-L34G].

32.

See Robert Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge
for Privacy, Security and National Security, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1753 (2019);
see also Alexa Koenig, ”Half the Truth is Often a Great Lie”: Deep Fakes,
Open Source Information, and International Criminal Law, 113 AJIL
UNBOUND, 250, 251 (2019).

33.

See Jay D. Aronson, The Utility of User Generated Content in Human
Rights Investigations, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
AND PRACTICE 129, 131 (Molly K. Land & Jay D. Aronson eds., 2018)
(explaining how most footage captured by citizens shows evidence that a
crime occurred, not evidence of who might be responsible).

34.

See Hamilton, supra note 17, at 32–33.
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All of these issues are worthy of scrutiny. But there is another
aspect of the move toward digital evidence that has received less
attention, even though its implications are just as significant for the
future of international criminal investigations. Specifically, digital
evidence does not just bring a new form of evidence into the
international criminal justice system, it brings in a host of new actors
as well.

New Actors in the Investigatory Landscape
International criminal investigations have traditionally been
dominated by trained investigators with professional obligations to a
public judicial institution. 35 Today though, the composition of actors
involved in these investigations is skewing increasingly toward private
actors, who have no public-facing obligations. 36 These actors include
ordinary citizens, civil society groups, and lawyers. 37 They also, though
perhaps less visibly, include technology companies like Google, which
owns YouTube. 38
YouTube is part of a social media industry that is largely selfregulated. 39 It writes its own rules – or, in YouTube’s terminology,
‘Community Guidelines’, which it uses to determine whether to remove

35.

See CHRISTIAN AXBOE NIELSEN & JANN K. KLEFFNER, A HANDBOOK ON
ASSISTING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 64 (Maria Nystedt
ed.,2011),
https://fba.se/contentassets/6f4962727ea34af5940fa8c448f3d30f/handbo
ok-on-assisting-international-criminal-investigations.pdf
[perma.cc/9HV3-D67W].

36.

See Mehandru & Koenig, supra note 31 (“[C]itizens are increasingly
uploading vast amounts of digital imagery and videos to social media
platforms to spread awareness of human rights violations and possible war
crimes . . . “).

37.

See, e.g., Lindsay Freeman, Digital Evidence and War Crimes
Prosecutions: The Impact of Digital Technologies on International
Criminal Investigations and Trials, 41 Fᴏʀᴅʜᴀᴍ Iɴᴛ’ʟ L.J. 283, 332 (2018)
(describing international organizations and lawyers’ efforts to collect
evidence in Syria, as well as citizen journalism).

38.

See id. at 318 (discussing the use of Google Earth satellite images); see
also Kevin B. Johnston, Top 4 Companies Owned by Google,
(June
25,
2019),
INVESTOPEDIA
https://www.investopedia.com/investing/companies-owned-by-google/
[https://perma.cc/GR2E-A7PU] (noting that Google owns YouTube).

39.

See generally Tarleton Gillespie, Governance of and by Platforms, in THE
SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL MEDIA (Jean Burgess, Alice Marwick &
Thomas Poell eds., 2017) (discussing the broad safe harbor protections
offered to U.S.-based social media platforms, as well as the steps these
platforms have undertaken, on their own accord, to regulate content
appearing on their sites)..].
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content that appears on its platform. 40 But it is also part of a legally
pluralist landscape. 41 Many other actors – including states, civil society
groups, and international organizations, argue that different rules or,
at a minimum, enforcement priorities, should apply in certain cases.42
And it was exactly this contestation over enforcement priorities that
lay behind the sudden disappearance of so many Syrian videos from
YouTube in the summer of 2017.
The change to YouTube’s algorithm was catalyzed by the U.K
government, which, ironically enough, was seeking to respond to an
attack on civilians on its territory. 43 In May 2017, a radicalized British
national, Salman Abedi, launched a suicide bomb attack on a pop
concert in Manchester, England, killing 22 concertgoers, including 7
children. 44 Abedi had reportedly been influenced by a Libyan group
that was an Al Qaeda affiliate. 45 In the aftermath of the bombing, then
British Prime Minister, Theresa May, gathered with G7 leaders in Italy
to try to strengthen counter-terrorism efforts. 46
40.

Policies
and
Safety:
Community
Guidelines,
YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/about/policies/#community-guidelines
[https://perma.cc/MAB5-67XJ].

41.

See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big
Data, Private Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1153 (2018) (describing a “pluralist model of speech
control”); Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and
Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1664 (2018)
(describing a “pluralistic system of influence” over content moderation).
For further development of this concept, see Rebecca J. Hamilton,
Governing the Global Public Square (on file with author).

42.

See, e.g., James Griffiths, Governments are Rushing to Regulate the
Internet. Users Could End Up Paying the Price, CNN (Apr. 18, 2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/08/uk/internet-regulation-uk-australiaintl-gbr/index.html [perma.cc/7R3H-2A7J] (discussing calls for
governmental regulation of social media in Australia, the United
Kingdom, and Singapore).

43.

Arjun Kharpal, Google Outlines 4 Steps to Tackle Terrorist-Related
Content
on
YouTube,
CNBC
(June
19,
2017),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/19/google-youtube-tackles-terroristvideos.html [https://perma.cc/FP3J-Q9BV].

44.

Manchester Attack: Who Were the Victims?, BBC NEWS (June 3, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-40012738 [perma.cc/7XUU-ET4H].

45.

Jamie Doward et al., How Manchester Bomber Salman Abedi Was
Radicalized by his Links to Libya, THE GUARDIAN (May 28, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/may/28/salman-abedimanchester-arena-bomber-radicalisation [https://perma.cc/V7V2-92HP].

46.

Anushka Asthana, G7 Leaders Agree Steps to Tackle Terrorism after
GUARDIAN
(May
26,
2017),
Manchester
Bombing,
THE
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/may/26/theresa-maycalls-g7-leaders-help-prosecute-foreign-fighters [perma.cc/U5LE-MARB].
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“We are already working with social media companies to halt the
spread of extremist material … that is warping young minds” said
May. “I am clear that corporations can do more. Indeed they
have a social responsibility to now step up their efforts to remove
harmful content from their networks.” 47

The change in algorithm at YouTube over the summer of 2017 was
part of a response to May’s concerns. 48 From YouTube’s perspective,
the change made sense. Soon after May’s plea, the European
Commission pushed for greater regulation of online content, 49 and as of
2019, YouTube and other major social media companies have just one
hour to remove terrorist content that is reported to them. 50 If they
repeatedly fail to do so, they face fines of up to 4% of their global
turnover. 51
Scholars have highlighted how so-called collateral censorship –
where states get private companies to enforce their regulatory goals for
them – leads to over-removal of content. 52 It makes business sense for
YouTube to preemptively remove anything that could potentially be
reported as “terrorist content” – even if this comes at the cost of

47.

Id.

48.

Kent Walker, Four Steps We’re Taking Today to Fight Terrorism Online,
Google
(June
18,
2017),
https://www.blog.google/around-theglobe/google-europe/four-steps-were-taking-today-fight-online-terror/
[perma.cc/V7FP-5ZRS]. Subsequently, the European Commission issued
a communication on the “prevention, detection, and removal of illegal
online content, including hatred, violence, and terrorist propaganda.”
European Parliament, Legislative Train, Area of Justice and
Fundamental Rights: Preventing the Dissemination of Terrorist Content
Online (July 2019) [hereinafter European Parliament, Communication on
Preventing
Online
Illegal
Content],
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislativetrain/api/stages/report/current/theme/area-of-justice-and-fundamentalrights/file/preventing-the-dissemination-of-terrorist-content-online
[perma.cc/K24M-KEZR] (proposing legislation requiring major social
media companies to remove terrorist content within one hour, under
threat of fine).

49.

See European Parliament, Communication on Preventing Online Illegal
Content supra note 48.

50.

European Parliament Press Release, Terrorist Content Online Should be
Removed Within One Hour, Says EP (Apr. 17, 2019),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/pressroom/20190410IPR37571/terrorist-content-online-should-be-removedwithin-one-hour-says-ep [perma.cc/C3UR-9P8K].

51.

Id.

52.

See e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127
HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2298, 2324 (2014).
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removing content that could be used for war crimes prosecutions. 53 And
YouTube is not the only platform for whom the incentives line up in
this way. 54
After the mainstream media reported on the sudden disappearance
of the Syrian videos, YouTube acknowledged that the technical changes
it had made required improvements, and explained that “When it’s
brought to our attention that a video or channel has been removed
mistakenly, we act quickly to reinstate it.” 55 They urged those who
wanted their videos reinstated, or who were worried about future videos
being removed, to provide YouTube with additional context explaining
why the video was not being posted simply to glorify violence. 56
The Syrian Archive, which coordinates with a number of the Syrian
groups doing documentation work, 57 has worked with YouTube to
restore 200,000 of the videos that were removed during the summer of
2017. 58 But providing YouTube with the context it seeks is timeconsuming work, and Syrian civil society groups are already overstretched. 59 Most simply do not have the capacity to do what YouTube
is asking. 60 Moreover, as Syrian Archive founder, Hadi al-Khatib,
explains, there are plenty of instances in which the person who uploaded
the content has since been imprisoned or killed. 61 As of January 2019,
53.

See id. at 2299 (“Owners of private infrastructure, hoping to reduce legal
uncertainty and to ensure an uncomplicated business environment, often
have incentives to be helpful even without direct government threats.”).

54.

Facebook’s latest algorithms for example, have helped the platform ensure
that only 0.04 percent of uploaded content that it believes would fall afoul
of its guidelines on terrorist content ever actually appeared online; in
other words, its pre-emptive removal rate for this content is a stunningly
high 99.6 percent. See Community Standards Enforcement Report,
Facebook
Transparency
(May
2019),
https://transparency.facebook.com/community-standardsenforcement#terrorist-propaganda [perma.cc/T5KW-JPEA].

55.

Rosen, supra note 8 (quoting a statement released by YouTube in
response to concerns about the disappearance of the Syrian videos).

56.

IMPORTANCE
OF
CONTEXT,
YOUTUBE
THE
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6345162?hl=en
[perma.cc/K4RU-AMCN].

57.

See SYRIAN ARCHIVE, https://syrianarchive.org/en [perma.cc/PM3MXRCX] (“The Syrian Archive is a Syrian-led and initiated collective of
human rights activists dedicated to curating visual documentation
relating to human rights violations and other crimes committed by all
sides during the conflict in Syria with the goal of creating an evidencebased tool for reporting, advocacy and accountability purposes.”).

58.

See Rosen, supra note 8.

59.

Id.

60.

Id.

61.

Id.
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some 190,000 of the videos removed in the summer of 2017 remain
unavailable. 62 And the Syrian Archive reports numerous instances of
restored content being removed again, with the removal-restoration
cycle being repeated multiple times with respect to the same video. 63
Even if Syrian activists continue to make progress with the
YouTube removals that arose from the 2017 algorithm change, the
broader problem is not going away. Social media platforms are
operating in a regulatory landscape that is in flux, and they will
continue to adjust their content moderation systems to sustain their
business model. Sometimes, especially in the face of a media outcry,
changes that have a detrimental impact on the preservation of potential
war crimes evidence will be reversed. But, unlike the actors who have
traditionally comprised international criminal investigations, the
technology companies who have unwittingly found themselves in this
investigatory space cannot be expected to prioritize the goals of justice
and accountability in the face of competing business demands.
YouTube’s tagline is “Broadcast Yourself.” 64 People around the
world have taken up the invitation, including people whose lives are
being lived out in conflict zones. Proponents of international criminal
justice have seized upon the resulting material for its evidentiary value,
and we are seeing the field of international criminal investigations in
the midst of a major transformation as a consequence. There has been
plenty of commentary about this transformation in terms of the
challenges and opportunities that the evidence itself brings. But less
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